Regulating Systemic Risk in Canada by Anand, Anita & Peihani, Maziar
The Peter A. Allard School of Law 
Allard Research Commons 
Faculty Publications Allard Faculty Publications 
2019 
Regulating Systemic Risk in Canada 
Anita Anand 
University of Toronto, Faculty of Law 
Maziar Peihani 
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, peihani@allard.ubc.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons 
Citation Details 
Anita Anand & Maziar Peihani "Regulating Systemic Risk in Canada" in Douglas W Arner et al, eds, 
Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: Ten Years After the Great Crash (Waterloo: Centre for International 
Governance Innovation, 2019) 11. 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Allard Faculty Publications at Allard Research 




Anita  Anand and Maziar  Pe ihani
The effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) were profound: stock prices plummeted, investors 
tried to liquidate their holdings, financial institutions teetered on the brink of bankruptcy and 
credit markets froze as liquidity vanished from financial markets. Systemic risk that may have 
seemed obvious to market observers was realized when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy 
on September 15, 2008. Just prior to this filing, the Dow Jones Index suffered the largest loss 
since September 11, 2001, plummeting more than 500 points. With this decline, US$700 billion 
in value vanished from retirement plans, government pension funds and other investment 
portfolios.1 World markets only started to stabilize after the announcement of the US$700-
billion Troubled Asset Relief Program and similar massive bailouts by governments around the 
world.2
1 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the 
Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States ( January 2011) at 356, online: <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf>. 
2 George Walker, “Credit Contraction, Financial Collapse and Global Recession: pt 1” (2009) 1 JIBFL 5; A Cohen, 
“Global Financial Crisis – Timeline” (2009) 1 JIBFL 10.
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The GFC led to an unprecedented wave of structural and regulatory reforms internationally 
and within the Group of Twenty (G20) countries.3 Building on existing literature regarding 
systemic risk and financial policy, this chapter examines the Canadian financial system and 
assesses the structural and regulatory reforms that have followed the GFC. The chapter analyzes 
the post-crisis regulatory regime based on its ability to detect, prevent and address sources 
of systemic risk in the financial system. We adopt a broad notion of systemic risk that goes 
beyond the commonly held view that systemic risk arises from the widespread distress caused 
by failure of individual financial institutions, often referred to as the domino effect.4 Rather than 
concentrating exclusively on contagion or chains of failures, we believe that systemic risk can 
also arise from the common exposure to macroeconomic factors across sectors and institutions 
in the financial markets.5 
This chapter acknowledges that a multiplicity of factors contributes to the resiliency of a 
financial system. In Canada’s case, for example, these factors include stronger bank capital ratios, 
stricter mortgage underwriting requirements, law reforms and new resolution tools. We argue 
that heightened leverage in the financial system, which is reflected in high household debt 
and inflated house prices, remains an important source of vulnerability across Group of Seven 
(G7) economies and especially in Canada. We contend that Canadian regulators’ ability to 
address systemic risk is limited by the structure of the regime, built on a sector-by-sector model, 
without any one institution responsible for comprehensively regulating the financial system. 
The regulatory regime is a partial consequence of the historical evolution of financial markets in 
Canada and their constitutional underpinnings.
As the Canadian case study reveals, diffusion of regulatory oversight can lead to failures in 
addressing system-wide issues, as well as poor communication and coordination among 
various bodies, all of which may fail to contain systemic risk. One possible solution, advocated 
in international assessments as well as academic literature on systemic risk, is to establish a 
macroprudential regulator to monitor the entire financial system.6 As will be explained, whereas 
this approach has been adopted in other jurisdictions, such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom, it is unlikely to gain momentum in Canada, given the reality of path dependency in 
regulatory policy making. 
3 See G20 Information Centre, “Global Plan for Recovery and Reform” (Statement issued by the G20 leaders,
 London, 2 April 2009), online: <www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0402.html>; G20 Information Centre, 
“Global Plan Annex: Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System” (Statement issued by the G20 leaders, London, 
2 April 2009), online: <www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html>. L 
4 For an example of this view, see Steven L. Schwarcz, “Systemic Risk” (2008) 97 Geo LJ 193, which focuses on “economic 
shock,” “failure of a chain of markets or institutions” and “a chain of significant losses to financial institutions” as key 
concepts in defining systemic risk.
5 Claudio Borio, “Towards a macroprudential framework for financial supervision and regulation?” (2003) Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) Working Paper No 128 at 5–7, online: <www.bis.org/publ/work128.pdf>; see also Anita 
Anand, Michael Trebilcock & Michael Rosenstock, “Institutional Design and the New Systemic Risk in Banking Crises” 
in Anita Anand, ed, Systemic Risk and Institutional Design (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016) [Anand, Systemic 
Risk].
6 As we will discuss later in this chapter, both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) have made such a recommendation to policy makers. For notable examples in the literature that are in line with 
this view, see Paul Jenkins & David Longworth, “Securing Monetary and Financial Stability: Why Canada Needs a 
Macroprudential Policy Framework” (2015) CD Howe Institute Commentary No 429 at 10–11, online: <www.cdhowe.
org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/commentary_429.pdf>; Samuel Howorth et al, “Improving 
Canada’s Financial Stability Governance Regime” CIGI, Special Report, 22 November 2016 at 6–7, online: <www.
cigionline.org/publications/improving-canadas-financial-stability-governance-regime>; Paul Tucker, “The Design and 
Governance of Financial Stability Regimes” CIGI, Essays on International Finance, vol 3, September 2016, online: 
<www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/financial_essay_vol.3_web.pdf>.
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The absence of a formal macroprudential regulator does not prevent Canadian regulators from 
working collaboratively toward more effective management of systemic risk. This goal can be 
achieved by establishing financial stability as an overriding priority for inter-agency regulatory 
groups. These bodies should extend their membership to include all key federal and provincial 
regulators and establish a robust working plan for monitoring system-wide vulnerabilities, 
which would ensure timely attention and action on problems by competent authorities. This 
chapter offers specific recommendations to enhance coordination among different policy-
making bodies in the financial markets. 
We begin by discussing the modern financial and regulatory landscape in Canada and then 
examine the structural and regulatory reforms that were undertaken after the GFC. We focus on 
three areas of reform, namely: bank regulatory reforms; housing market measures; and securities 
law reforms, in particular the recently proposed Capital Markets Stability Act. The chapter then 
assesses the challenges of systemic risk oversight followed by reform suggestions that can help 
to establish a more integrated framework for systemic risk oversight. 
The Canadian Financial Landscape
Canada has a sophisticated financial system that provides liquidity for participants alongside 
prudential oversight and stability for depositors. With more than 10 years having passed since 
the GFC, it is appropriate to examine the current state of Canada’s financial system in order to 
assess its ability to respond to systemic risks. This section highlights the core characteristics of 
Canada’s financial system and provides an overview of its regulatory framework.
Canada’s financial system is dominated by a handful of key players in most financial subsectors. 
Cumulatively, their assets total approximately 500 percent of Canada’s GDP.7 Three particular 
market constituent groups — banks, insurance companies and pension funds — wield significant 
market influence, given their assets and market functions. 
The country’s banking sector is highly concentrated, with the six federally chartered banks — 
the Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto Dominion, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank 
of Canada (CIBC), Bank of Montreal and National Bank of Canada — holding 93 percent of 
the country’s total bank assets in aggregate.8 These banks primarily engage in household lending, 
corporate lending, wealth management and trading.
As of February 2018, Canada’s total household credit stood at $2.1 trillion,9 of which 71 percent 
comprised residential mortgages and 28 percent comprised consumer credit such as personal lines 
of credit and credit cards.10 Chartered banks account for 77 percent and non-bank firms, such as 
trust and loan companies and credit unions, account for 19 percent of Canada’s total household 
credit.11 Particularly problematic in this debt-heavy environment is the existence of the shadow 
7 IMF, Canada: Financial Sector Stability Assessment (2014) IMF Country Report No 14/29 [IMF, FSSA] at 8, online: 
<www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41299.0>. 
8 Ibid at 11.
9 All dollar figures in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted. 
10 BoC, “Household Credit: Overview of Total Household Credit” (2018), online: <https://credit.bankofcanada.ca/
householdcredit#1>. 
11 BoC, “Household Credit: Sources of Household Credit” (2018), online: <https://credit.bankofcanada.ca/
householdcredit#1>.
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banking industry, which consists chiefly of credit intermediation outside the traditional banking 
system.12 The Bank of Canada (BoC) estimates that its credit value amounts to $1.1 trillion, 
roughly half of the $2.1 trillion of traditional bank liabilities.13 The most important components 
of shadow banking are investment funds (46 percent) followed by repo (repurchase agreement) 
and securities lending transactions (29 percent). These figures are considerable, engaging the 
interests of diverse financial market participants, including individual investors, smaller lending 
operations, and the various intermediaries and counterparties relying on shadow banking 
activities for their business. These sizeable loans present systemic risk challenges by increasing 
consumer debt loads on those borrowers who may be more vulnerable to an increased interest 
rate. 
The insurance sector forms the second of the three constituent groups, wielding significant 
influence on Canada’s financial market. Indeed, Canada’s insurance sector accounts for 16 
percent of the country’s financial sector assets. The industry is broadly divided in terms of life 
insurance and property and casualty insurance specializations. Three domestic firms (Sun Life 
Financial, Great-West Life and Manulife Financial) hold three-quarters of life and health 
insurance assets in Canada.14 In contrast, the property and casualty insurance sector is highly 
competitive and includes a number of foreign-owned companies that collect more than half of 
the premiums earned in Canada.15 
Beyond the two insurance lines, mortgage insurance forms a major portion of Canada’s total 
insurance sector value. Mortgage insurance coverage is provided by the Canada Mortgage 
and Housing Corporation (CMHC), a federal Crown corporation, and two private insurance 
firms.16 All federally regulated lenders must obtain mortgage default insurance for home buyers 
with less than a 20 percent down payment. As of March 2015, government-backed insurance 
covered 56 percent of all outstanding residential mortgages.17 
Lastly, Canadian pension funds occupy a unique position as significant players in Canadian 
and global financial markets. Their investment capacity is broad, their influence is significant 
and their diverse asset classes offer enviable returns while mitigating risk. These funds hold 
approximately 15 percent of the country’s total assets in the financial system. Of this 15 percent, 
12 For the definition of shadow banking, see FSB, Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation ‒ 
Recommendations of the Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2011) at 3, online: <www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/
uploads/r_111027a.pdf>. 
13 See Bo Young Chang et al, Monitoring Shadow Banking in Canada: A Hybrid Approach (BoC, 2016) at 28, online: <www.
bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/fsr-december-2016-chang.pdf>.
14 IMF, FSSA, supra note 7 at 58. See also Department of Finance Canada, Supporting a Strong and Growing Economy: 
Positioning Canada’s Financial Sector for the Future (Department of Finance Canada, 2016) [Department of Finance 
Canada, Supporting a Strong and Growing Economy] at 13, online: <www.fin.gc.ca/activty/consult/ssge-sefc-eng.pdf>.
15 As of 2016, there were 74 foreign incorporated property and casualty insurers operating in Canada, with assets of  
$35 billion. See Department of Finance Canada, Supporting a Strong and Growing Economy, supra note 14 at 14; FSB, Peer 
Review of Canada: Review Report (FSB, 2012) at 9, online: <www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_120130.pdf>. 
16 Namely Genworth MI Canada and Canada Guaranty. See Department of Finance Canada, “Overview: Lender Risk 
Sharing for Government-Backed Insured Mortgages” (21 October 2016), online: <www.fin.gc.ca/n16/data/16-136_1-
eng.asp#_ftn1>. 
17 Ibid. In the event a mortgage insurer is unable to make an insurance payout to the lender, the federal government backs 
100 percent of the CMHC’s liability as well as the private insurers’ liability (subject to a 10 percent deductible). See 
Department of Finance Canada, Supporting a Strong and Growing Economy, supra note 14 at 15.
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the eight largest public pension funds control two-thirds of this share, with more than $1 trillion 
in net assets under management.18 
Canada’s capital market activity is concentrated, with banks playing a dominant role through 
their subsidiaries. Indeed, the six largest securities dealers are owned by the big six Canadian 
banks. In 2015, bank subsidiaries underwrote 61 percent of all deals, accounting for 64 percent 
of the value of the issued securities.19 The three most prominent exchanges in Canada are 
the Toronto Stock Exchange, the Bourse de Montréal and the TSX Venture Exchange. The 
clearing, settlement and recording of financial transactions are undertaken by financial market 
infrastructures, three of which have been designated as systemically important.20 Given the 
integrated and concentrated financial system, it is unsurprising that Canadian financial markets 
can be exposed to systemic risks. The structure of a regime, in our view, is itself a vulnerability. 
We turn now to examine the regulatory characteristics of this regime in greater detail.
The Regulatory Regime of Canada’s 
Financial Market
This section examines the composition of Canada’s financial market in terms of regulators that 
have some role in managing or overseeing systemic risk. Fundamentally, Canada’s regulatory 
system is based on a complex constitutional framework that divides the responsibility for 
supervision of the financial markets between federal and provincial governments and their 
designated agencies. The ramifications of this divided regulatory approach is that financial 
institutions are federally regulated while securities markets, including public companies, are 
regulated at the provincial level.21 Firms in other sectors, such as insurance companies, trust and 
loan companies, credit unions and pension plans, can be incorporated and regulated at both the 
provincial and federal levels.22 
Thirteen provincial and territorial regulatory authorities regulate the securities markets across 
Canada. The provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec supervise about 95 
percent of the country’s capital markets.23 While each regulator is operationally independent and 
administers a separate set of laws and regulations, they have experienced moderate success in 
harmonizing their policies and supervisory practices.24 However, in certain areas involving new 
18 These pension funds are the Canada Pension Plan, Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, the Ontario Teachers’ 
Pension Plan, the Public Sector Pension Investment Board, the British Columbia Investment Management Corporation, 
the Alberta Investment Management Corporation, the Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan and the Ontario Municipal 
Employees Retirement System. 
19 See also IMF, FSSA, supra note 7 at 10.
20 Ibid. These are the Large Value Transfer System, CDX and Canadian Derivatives Clearing Service. 
21 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), Supervisory Framework (April 2014), online: <www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rai-eri/sp-ps/Pages/sff.aspx>.
22 See OSFI, “Who We Regulate” (23 October 2014), online: <www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/wt-ow/Pages/wwr-er.
aspx?sc=1&gc=4#WWRLink14>; IMF, FSSA, supra note 7 at 21.
23 IMF, “Canada: Financial Sector Assessment Program: IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation ‒ 
Detailed Assessment of Implementation” (March 2014), IMF Country Report No 14/73 [IMF Country Report] at 8, 
online: <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1473.pdf>.
24 Harmonization has been facilitated by the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), the umbrella organization for 
provincial and territorial securities regulators that seeks to improve, coordinate and harmonize regulation of capital 
markets in Canada. See CSA, “Who We Are”, online: <www.securities-administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=77>. We 
discuss the role of the CSA in enacting securities regulatory reforms in more detail below.
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financial developments such as fintech (for example, robo advisers) and cryptoassets, the non-
centralized regulatory structure creates jurisdictional confusion for regulated parties, regulatory 
overlap and inefficient regulatory resource allocation.
The exclusively provincial and territorial nature of Canadian securities regulation has been 
confirmed in two landmark decisions handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada.25 These 
cases upheld the constitutional division of powers in Canada’s federal system, ultimately 
deferring to the status quo of provincial oversight of securities markets. They also recognized 
the federal government’s jurisdiction on matters of genuine national importance and scope 
going to trade as a whole, including management of systemic risk and national data collection, 
as distinct from provincial concerns.26 
Apart from the regulation of capital markets, the responsibility for financial market oversight 
is shared at the federal level among the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the BoC, the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(CDIC) and the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC). The MoF is headed up by 
the elected member of Parliament who has been designated to be the minister of finance by 
the prime minister. This ministry oversees the federal regulators and is in charge of all matters 
relating to the financial affairs of Canada not assigned to the Treasury Board or another minister. 
The BoC derives its authority from the Bank of Canada Act and oversees Canada’s payment, 
clearing and settlement systems. The BoC is also the lender of last resort and is in charge of price 
stability in the financial system. OSFI is governed by a number of legislative frameworks and 
serves as the prudential regulator. The CDIC provides insurance against the loss of deposits of 
member institutions. Lastly, the FCAC is responsible for protecting consumers and informing 
them of financial products and services. 
In a discussion of systemic risk, OSFI’s role deserves particular attention because its primary 
responsibility is the supervision of the domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs), which 
dominate financial intermediation in the Canadian economy. OSFI’s approach to supervision 
is aligned with international standards, in particular the Basel Core Principles of Supervision, 
which serve as a basic reference for banking supervisors around the world.27 
OSFI’s approach to regulatory supervision over federally regulated financial institutions (FRFIs) 
enables the office to enact meaningful policy initiatives aimed at mitigating systemic risk. In 
March 2013, OSFI designated Canada’s six largest banks (Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto 
Dominion, Bank of Nova Scotia, CIBC, Bank of Montreal and National Bank of Canada) as 
D-SIBs.28 This designation subjects these banks to continued intense supervision and requires 
them to comply with stricter capital and disclosure requirements.29 Furthermore, the CDIC 
has been named as the resolution authority for D-SIBs and has begun recovery and resolution 
planning for them. Taken together, the additional layer of prudential oversight ensures continued 
25 Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66; Reference re PanCanadian Securities Regulation, 2018 SCC 48 (CanLII).
26 Ibid.
27 OSFI, Supervisory Framework (Ottawa: OSFI, 2010) at 1, online: <www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rai-eri/sp-ps/Pages/
sff.aspx>. See also BIS, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
(BIS, 2012), online: <www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.htm>. See also Anita Anand & Andrew Green, “Regulating Financial 
Institutions: The Value of Opacity” (2012) 57:3 McGill LJ 399.
28 OSFI, “The OSFI Pillar” (Spring 2013) at 1, online: <www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/Docs/op_2013_sp.pdf>. 
29 OSFI, OSFI Annual Report 2013-2014 at 10, online: <www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/docs/ar-ra/1314/eng/ar1314.pdf>.
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regulatory awareness of the banks’ approaches to mitigating systemic risks. This high degree of 
scrutiny is sensible, given Canada’s market concentration and the corresponding influence of 
such significant market participants. 
As outlined above, Canada’s federal regulatory organizations each has a distinct legal mandate, 
yet together they seek to achieve cooperation and coordination through a number of fora, 
including: 
• the Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee (FISC), the primary forum through 
which the Department of Finance (DoF), OSFI, the CDIC and the BoC exchange 
information on banks and coordinate intervention for troubled banks; 30 
• the Senior Advisory Committee (SAC), a forum with the same membership as FISC, 
through which these bodies deliberate on financial policy issues, including proposed 
legislation, financial stability and regulatory frameworks;31 and 
• the Heads of Agencies Committee (HoA), which serves as an informal forum for policy 
coordination among the securities regulators and federal agencies. It includes chairs 
of the four largest securities commissions in Canada, as well as the BoC governor, the 
superintendent of financial institutions and senior officials from the DoF.32 Following the 
GFC, the HoA’s work focused on implementing G20 commitments, in particular those 
with respect to systemic risk.33
Holistically, these fora offer general integration among the various regulatory and advisory 
bodies. This institutional integration is beneficial from a risk-management perspective in that 
specialized bodies can share information with their peers and coordinate with market participants 
such as banks and other FRFIs. To date, this framework succeeds in ensuring that Canadian 
financial institutions meet or surpass the various international financial metrics relating to 
liquidity, capital requirements and stress indicators. As argued below, these fora also offer an 
important venue for dialogue and leadership on surveillance of system-wide vulnerabilities that 
may not be otherwise captured under the sector-by-sector regulatory model. Nevertheless, the 
fragmentary nature of this structure may expose the markets to systemic risk, whatever measures 
may be taken toward coordination. 
30 See Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2010 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada at para 5.16, online: 
<www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201010_05_e_34288.html>. The FISC’s meetings are chaired by OSFI 
and held quarterly. See also OSFI, “Opening remarks by Assistant Superintendent Carolyn Rogers to the Standing 
Senate Committee on National Finance, Ottawa, Ontario, May 17, 2017” [Carolyn Rogers, “Opening Remarks”], online: 
<www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/osfi-bsif/med/sp-ds/Pages/cr20170517.aspx>. 
31 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, supra note 30 at para 5.17. The SAC is chaired by the deputy minister of 
finance. The meetings are held three to four times a year.
32 IMF Country Report, supra note 23 at 41.
33 Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, shadow banking, hedge funds and financial benchmarks were among the themes 
being considered: ibid at 42. While the HoA meets quarterly, there has not been any recent public update on its work 
agenda or priorities: see Carolyn Rogers, “Opening Remarks”, supra note 30.
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Structural and Regulatory Reforms 
Following the GFC
In the post-GFC financial market, policy makers and market participants are vigilant about 
understanding risk in all its permutations, especially as it affects the broader financial system. 
According to a survey of financial institutions in Canada by the Global Risk Institute, the 
most significant risk concerns today are increased frequency and sophistication of cyber 
attacks, over-heated housing markets, ever-rising consumer debt and mounting geopolitical 
uncertainties around the globe.34 The GFC and its aftermath serve as a useful case study of 
potential regulatory responses to the contagion that spread after the market for collateralized 
debt obligations collapsed. This section focuses on those responses, including reforms that are 
important from a systemic risk perspective.
In the banking sector, Canadian policy makers have implemented the Basel III capital and 
liquidity reforms that represent a central part of the G20 post-crisis reform agenda.35 Under the 
new regulations issued by OSFI, banks are required to hold common equity tier one (CET1) 
of at least seven percent and a total capital buffer of at least 10.5 percent against risk-weighted 
assets.36 Canadian banks are also expected to meet a leverage ratio of at least three percent.37 
OSFI determines the leverage ratio for individual institutions on a bilateral basis, which remains 
confidential.38 The six largest Canadian banks have also been named by OSFI as D-SIBs. This 
designation means that these institutions are subject to enhanced disclosure requirements and 
intense supervision and must hold an additional one percent of CET1 capital.39
Another important reform concerns systemically important financial institution resolutions. 
In line with the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) key attributes, Canada has introduced 
important changes to its bank resolution regime.40 The CDIC has been designated as the 
resolution authority for Canadian D-SIBs through its Complex Resolution Division, which 
develops and maintains resolution plans for D-SIBs.41 In the event that a D-SIB becomes, or 
is about to become, unviable, the governor-in-council will appoint the CDIC as the receiver 
34 Global Risk Institute, “2017-2018 Risk Outlook Survey Results” (2018) Global Risk Institute White Paper, online: 
<http://globalriskinstitute.org/publications/2017-2018-risk-outlook-survey-results/>. 
35 An important example is the capital adequacy requirements guideline through which OSFI implements Basel III capital 
rules. See OSFI, Capital Adequacy Requirements (CAR) (Ottawa: OSFI, 2018), online: <www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rg-
ro/gdn-ort/gl-ld/Pages/CAR18_chpt1.aspx#1.2>.
36 Ibid at para 55. 
37 OSFI, Leverage Requirements Guideline (Ottawa: OSFI, 2014), online: <www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rg-ro/gdn-ort/gl-ld/
Pages/LR.aspx>.
38 Ibid.
39 OSFI, Domestic Systemic Importance and Capital Targets - DTIs (Ottawa: OSFI, 2013). See also OSFI, OSFI Annual Report 
2016-2017 (Ottawa: OSFI, 2017) at 10, online: <www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/Docs/ar-ra/1617/eng/ar1617.pdf>. In a related 
development, the FSB named the Royal Bank of Canada a global systemically important bank (G-SIB). The G-SIB 
designation also subjects banks to additional regulatory and supervisory requirements, although such requirements can 
even go beyond the D-SIB framework due to the risks that the firm can pose to global financial stability. See FSB, Press 
Release, 43/2017, “FSB publishes 2017 G-SIB list” (21 November 2017), online: <www.fsb.org/2017/11/fsb-publishes-
2017-g-sib-list/>; OSFI, News Release, “OSFI confirms Royal Bank of Canada designation as a global systemically 
important bank” (21 November 2017), online: <www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/osfi-bsif/med/Pages/nr20171121.aspx>. 
40 FSB, “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions” (FSB, 2014), online: <www.
financialstabilityboard.org/2014/10/r_141015> [FSB, Key Attributes].
41 See CDIC, “Resolution Division”, online: <www.cdic.ca/en/about-cdic/organization/Pages/crd.aspx>. 
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and can carry out necessary transactions for restructuring the bank’s business.42 The CDIC has 
a vast resolution tool kit that includes far-reaching powers such as disposing the bank’s shares 
and subordinated assets or amalgamating the failing bank with another solvent institution.43 
Furthermore, the CDIC can sell all or part of the bank’s assets and liabilities or create a bridge 
bank to take on systemically important functions until a more permanent solution is found. If 
the closure of a failing bank is not desirable, but resolution tools such as forced sale or a bridge 
bank cannot be used, the CDIC can keep the bank open by providing financial assistance in the 
form of deposits, loans, advances and guarantees.44 
Securities Law Reforms
The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) have played an important role in reforming 
Canadian securities law. Much like the many federal regulatory institutions coordinate their 
efforts through the fora listed above, the provincial securities regulators communicate and 
coordinate policy choices through the CSA.45 This umbrella organization introduced changes 
to the regulation of the OTC derivatives market. The reform agenda, which is carried out by 
the CSA and coordinated through the HoA,46 has primarily focused on central clearing of 
OTC derivatives, enhancing market transparency through trade repositories, and migration of 
standard transactions to exchanges and trading platforms. Similar to the banking sector reforms, 
these measures largely follow the work carried out by transnational bodies such as the FSB and 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).47 
Following the GFC, the CSA established a systemic risk subcommittee in 2009. The move was 
influenced by IOSCO’s recommendation that a securities regulator “should have or contribute 
to a process to monitor, mitigate, and manage systemic risk, appropriate to its mandate.”48 
Similarly, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) has established a new Risk Committee to 
strengthen its capability to detect and manage systemic risk. The Commission took on promoting 
financial stability as a new organizational role.49 The mandate of the Ontario Securities Act was 
amended to include systemic risk as a focal point in addition to investor protection and market 
efficiency.50
42 See OSFI, Guide to Intervention for Federally Regulated Deposit-Taking Institutions, online: <www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/
rai-eri/sp-ps/Pages/gid.aspx?pedisable=true>; Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, RSC 1985, c C-3, s 39.13-14 
[CDIC Act].
43 Ibid, s 10.
44 Ibid, s 39.
45 See CSA, “Who We Are”, supra note 24.
46 The HoA is a systemic oversight committee comprised of OSFI, the BoC, the DoF, the CSA chair and four provincial 
securities regulators. Its primary mandate is to exchange information among members and coordinate on issues of mutual 
importance. See IMF, FSSA, supra note 7 at 26.
47 FSB, Review of OTC derivatives market reform: Effectiveness and broader effects of the reforms (FSB, 2017), online: <www.
fsb.org/2017/06/review-of-otc-derivatives-market-reform-effectiveness-and-broader-effects-of-the-reforms/>; IOSCO, 
Report of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Board of IOSCO (18 March 2015) [IOSCO, Report], online: 
<www.iosco.org/publications/?subsection=pr&id=480>. 
48 IOSCO, Report, supra note 47, referencing Principle 6.
49 See Anita Anand, “Is systemic risk relevant to securities regulation?” (2010) 60:4 UTLJ 59; Anita Anand, ed, Systemic 
Risk, Institutional Design, and the Regulation of Financial Markets (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016). See also 
Mary Condon, “Canada’s Role in Expanded IOSCO Principles” (Address delivered at the Toronto Securities Leadership 
Seminar, 9 July 2012), online: <www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/NewsEvents_sp_20120709_canada-role-iosco-principles.htm>; 
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), Challenging the Status Quo: Annual Report 2017, online: <www.osc.gov.on.ca/
documents/en/Publications/Publications_rpt_2017_osc-annual-rpt_en.pdf>.
50 Ontario Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S.5, s 1.1.
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The most ambitious institutional reform on systemic risk, however, came in August 2014 when 
the federal government proposed the Capital Markets Stability Act (CMSA).51 The move came 
after an earlier failure to establish a national securities regulator. In Reference Re Securities Act, 
discussed above, the Supreme Court deemed the Canadian Securities Act to be outside the 
federal government’s purview.52 The court, however, recognized federal jurisdiction on matters 
of genuine national importance, including management of systemic risk and national data 
collection.53 Following the Supreme Court’s judgment, the federal government published a 
consultative draft of the CMSA that was subsequently revised in January 2016.54 
The Capital Markets Regulatory Authority (CMRA) is the new body that would administer 
the new framework proposed in the CMSA. The CMRA would deal with systemic risk in the 
capital markets, defined as “a threat to the stability of Canada’s financial system that originates 
in, is transmitted through or impairs capital markets and that has the potential to have a material 
adverse effect on the Canadian economy.”55 The CMRA can designate a product, service or 
benchmark as systemically important, although it does not have any entity-level designation 
powers. It can also issue regulations or orders on entities. However, all regulations are subject 
to agreement by the Council of Ministers, comprised of ministers of participating provinces 
responsible for the capital markets regulation as well as the federal minister of finance.56 As 
these individuals are elected officials, the initiative is inevitably subject to the political process.57 
Taken together, this approach to securities market regulation bolsters the individual influence 
of securities regulators across provinces and territories, and emphasizes the importance of 
coordination among these regulatory bodies in anticipation of financial crises. 
Household Debt: Mortgages and 
Market Stability
Beyond the regulation of capital markets, a number of measures have been taken to address 
increasing household debt and housing imbalances. These elements present another area of 
systemic risk that challenges the stability of Canada’s financial market. Indeed, Canada has 
one of the highest levels of household debt among G7 countries, with the household debt-to-
income ratio reaching almost 170 percent in 2017.58 The bulk of household credit growth comes 
from mortgages and home equity lines of credit.59 Housing prices continue to grow at a faster 
51 See DoF, “Capital Markets Stability Act – Draft for Consultation” (2014), online: <www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/2014/cmsa-
lsmc-l-eng.asp>. See also Anita Anand, “After the Reference: Regulating Systemic Risk in Canadian Financial Markets” 
in Anita Anand, ed, What’s Next for Canada: Securities Regulation After the Reference (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012).
52 Reference re Securities Act, supra note 25.
53 Ibid.
54 See CCMRS, Capital Markets Stability Act – Draft for Consultation ( January 2016), online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-
content/uploads/cmsa-consultation-draft-revised-en.pdf>. 
55 Ibid, art 3.
56 Ibid, s 76; Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, art 3(iv), online: 
<http://dev.ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/MOA-English.pdf>.
57 Anita Anand, “What About the Investors?” (2017) Canadian Foundation for the Advancement of Investor Rights White 
Paper, online: <http://faircanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/170505_FAIR-Anand-White-Paper-FINAL.pdf>.
58 IMF, “Canada – 2013 Article IV Consultation Concluding Statement of the Mission” [IMF, “Article IV Consultation”] at 
3, online: <www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/52/mcs112613>. 
59 BoC, Financial System Review (November 2017) at 4, online: <www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/fsr-
november2017.pdf>. 
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pace than justified by fundamental economics, with Toronto and Vancouver dominating the 
housing price acceleration. For example, housing prices in Toronto surged by 32 percent from 
2016 to 2017.60 In Vancouver, housing prices grew by more than 50 percent from mid-2013 
to mid-2016. While the slowdown of housing activity and the introduction of a 15 percent 
property tax on non-resident buyers caused a short pause to this trend, prices in Vancouver 
picked up shortly thereafter.61 
Against this background, Canadian authorities have sought to enhance the resiliency of the 
banking system in the midst of a housing downturn and to enhance the rigour of mortgage 
underwriting practices. OSFI’s Guideline B-20 requires that mortgage decisions be made based 
on an assessment of the borrower’s background as well as their willingness and capacity to 
service debt.62 The guideline advises banks to conduct in-person appraisal of the property and 
recommends those using third-party appraisal to ensure that appraisers operate “independent[ly] 
from the mortgage acquisition, loan processing and loan decision process.”63 
These provisions are complemented by Guideline B-21, which sets out further requirements 
regarding due diligence on lenders’ underwriting practices, portfolio management and stress 
testing, and portfolio risk management and stress testing.64 Since 2008, the federal government 
has also gradually tightened mortgage insurance rules, including reducing the maximum 
amortization period for insured mortgages from 40 to 25 years, introducing a minimum credit 
score of 620 as well as a minimum down payment of five percent for new mortgages,65 and 
reducing the loan-to-value ratio for insured refinanced mortgages from 100 percent to 80 
percent.66
The BoC has weighed in on the issue by noting that the Canadian housing market, with its 
debt ramifications, has market-wide problems. Indeed, Canada’s housing market has often been 
described as overheated.67 The increased cost of housing has coincided with a nearly decade-long 
period of cheap consumer credit. Consequently, Canadian households have become significantly 
indebted by borrowing against their home equity. 
In particular, the BoC is concerned about Canadians using home equity lines of credit to increase 
their borrowing capacity to very risky levels. BoC Governor Stephen Poloz explicitly noted that 
40 percent of all housing-backed loans are now blended home equity lines of credit, on which 
borrowers can choose to pay interest only and no principal. The risk of this high household debt 
60 BoC, Financial System Review ( June 2017) at 12, online: <www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/fsr-
june2017.pdf>. 
61 Ibid.
62 See OSFI, “Guideline B-20: Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices and Procedures”, online: <www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/
Eng/fi-if/rg-ro/gdn-ort/gl-ld/Pages/b20_dft.aspx>. 
63 Ibid.
64 OSFI, Residential Mortgage Insurance Underwriting Practices and Procedures (November 2014), online: <www.osfi-bsif.
gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rg-ro/gdn-ort/gl-ld/Pages/b21.aspx>. 
65 If the purchase price exceeds $500,000, the minimum down payment for the portion of the house price over $500,000 
will be 10 percent. See CMHC, “What are the General Requirements to Qualify for Homeowner Mortgage Loan 
Insurance?”, online: <www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/co/moloin/moloin_003.cfm>. 
66 Ibid. See also IMF, “Article IV Consultation”, supra note 58, Annex III.
67 “The end of Canada’s housing boom?”, Editorial, The Economist (18 May 2017), online: <www.economist.com/news/
americas/21722249-american-protectionism-not-only-threat-economy-end-canadas-housing-boom>.
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level makes Canadians more exposed to falling home prices and higher interest rates.68 As a 
result of these risks, the BoC has consistently warned Parliament and the public about the risk 
of higher household debt levels.69 While the housing market is cooling on a general level, the 
risk of high household debt coupled with likely increases in interest rates can exacerbate the 
stresses on systemic stability. 
Limitations of a Sector-by-sector 
Regulatory Model
The GFC raised the persistent issue of how to ensure effective oversight of systemic risk in 
a financial system. As discussed above, Canada mainly follows an institutional approach to 
regulation whereby separate agencies are entrusted with regulating different institutions and 
functions. While OSFI regulates federally incorporated banks and insurance companies, 
securities regulators oversee issuers of securities and investment firms. As Anita Anand, Michael 
Trebilcock and Michael Rosenstock note, different regulatory objectives can also underpin each 
regulatory domain.70 For example, whereas OSFI’s primary goal is to promote solvency among 
financial institutions, the FCAC and securities regulators are particularly concerned with the 
conduct of business, aiming to protect investors and consumers in the marketplace. This type 
of regulation in “silos” can prove difficult in times of financial market crisis, where regulatory 
coordination is warranted.
The recent experience of Home Capital, an alternative mortgage lender that experienced 
financial distress following a mortgage fraud scandal, highlights the challenges that an 
institutional or sector-by-sector model faces in regulating today’s interconnected markets. 
Although Home Capital had broken ties with brokers and underwriters involved in fraudulent 
mortgage practices, it was accused by the OSC of publicly hiding the incident and its impact 
on its mortgage business. Following escalating tension with the OSC, Home Capital issued 
subsequent statements to meet its disclosure obligations. However, these statements led to a 
significant loss of market confidence and raised uncertainty over the health of the broader 
housing market.71 Following a press release on March 27, 2017, which acknowledged the 
mortgage fraud incident, Home Capital shares plunged by more than 75 percent from $27.72 
on March 27 to $5.85 on May 5, and depositors withdrew more than $2 billion from the 
lender.72 Faced by a significant liquidity crunch, Home Capital took on an emergency line of 
credit from a major Canadian pension fund, followed by additional equity financing and a 
68 Poloz summarized these dangers in the following terms: “It’s time to remind folks that prices of houses can go down as 
well as up” (ibid). See Janet McFarland & Justin Giovannetti, “BoC’s Poloz issues warning about speculation in Toronto 
housing market”, The Globe and Mail (12 April 2017), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/real-estate/the-market/
toronto-and-hamilton-home-prices-soar-to-march-record/article34679288/>.
69 David Cochrane, “Household debt, home prices biggest risk to Canadian economy, Bank of Canada says”, CBC News (28 
November 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/bank-of-canada-household-debt-1.4422623>.
70 Anita Anand, Michael Trebilcock & Michael Rosenstock, “Institutional Design and the New Systemic Risk in Banking 
Crises” in Anita Anand, ed, Systemic Risk, Institutional Design, and the Regulation of Financial Markets (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2017) 1 at 25.
71 Home Capital Group Inc., 2017 Annual Report (2017) at 21, online: <www.homecapital.com/annual_reports/2017/
HomeCapitalAnnualReport2017.pdf>; Home Capital Group Inc., 2017 Second Quarter Report (2017) at 3, online:  
<www.homecapital.com/quarterly_reports.asp>. 
72 Armina Ligaya & Barbara Shecter, “‘Like the perfect storm’: An FP Investigation into the events that took Home Capital 
to the brink”, Financial Post (22 Sept 2017), online: <http://business.financialpost.com/news/inside-the-rise-and-fall-of-
home-capital>. 
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$2-billion line of credit from Berkshire Hathaway. More recently, the firm managed to secure a 
smaller credit facility on more favourable terms from two Canadian banks.73 
Although the Home Capital episode did not lead to significant financial market contagion, 
it nonetheless illustrates the challenges involved in coordinating regulatory oversight and 
enforcement. Whereas the mortgage fraud was initially seen as a disclosure failure within the 
OSC’s jurisdiction, the OSC’s enforcement came to bear upon the firm’s solvency, an imperative 
beyond the OSC’s mandate. Indeed, the firm’s press releases, which came after significant 
pressure from the OSC, triggered a massive depositor run and undermined the market 
confidence in both Home Capital and even the broader alternate mortgage sector.74 Arguably, 
the OSC’s enforcement actions fell perfectly within its mandate. However, it is unclear whether 
the regulator sought to communicate and coordinate with OSFI before intervention. As the 
next section suggests, similar challenges also surfaced earlier in the asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP) crisis, although the implications were much larger this time. 
The ABCP Crisis Revisited
Canada’s institutional regulatory approach came under significant pressure in the ABCP crisis. 
Fears of contagion arising from potential exposure to US subprime mortgages, combined with 
uncertainty about the underlying assets and the associated leverage, led to a rush by investors to 
exit the market. At the centre of the crisis was $35 billion in non-bank, or third-party, sponsored 
ABCP that was frozen because of the inability of conduits to roll over the papers.75 Due to 
different regulatory requirements for ABCP sponsorship, conduits sponsored by the Canadian 
banks were monitored by OSFI, whereas third-party conduits sponsored by foreign banks, such 
as Deutsche Bank, were regulated only by their home authorities. These banks, which did not 
have retail operations in Canada, refused to provide liquidity support for their conduits when 
the crisis unfolded. The conduits themselves were assumed to be governed by securities law. In 
a parliamentary hearing, Julie Dickson, then superintendent of OSFI, said: “People are covered. 
If you are an investor in a security in Canada, you are covered by the securities commissions. My 
job is to look after banks and bank depositors. If you’re an investor, you’re covered by securities 
commissions.”76
However, third-party conduits were, in fact, exempted from prospectus requirements, as their 
debt notes had received gold-plated credit ratings; investors were not covered by securities 
regulators.77 During this period, ABCP was distributed almost exclusively in the exempt market, 
73 James Bradshaw, “Home Capital taps banks to replace Buffett credit line”, The Globe and Mail (16 May 2018), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-home-capital-secures-new-credit-line-to-replace-buffett-funding/>. 
74 Daniel Tencer, “As Home Capital Crisis Deepens, Some Talk Openly of Canada-Wide ‘Contagion’”, Huffington Post  
(1 May 2017), online: <www.huffingtonpost.ca/2017/05/01/home-capital-contagion-financial-system-
canada_n_16365938.html>. 
75 IMF, Canada: Financial Sector Assessment Program ‒ Crisis Management and Bank Resolution Framework ‒ Technical Note 
(March 2014), IMF Country Report No 14/67 at 18, online: <www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/31/
Canada-Financial-Sector-Assessment-Program-Crisis-Management-and-Bank-Resolution-Framework-41403>; see 
also John Chant, “The ABCP Crisis in Canada: The Implications for the Regulation of Financial Markets” (2008) Expert 
Panel on Securities Regulation.
76 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Finance, “Evidence”, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 50 (16 June 2008) ( Julie 
Dickson), online: <www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/39-2/FINA/meeting-50/evidence>.
77 Paul Halpern et al, Back from the Brink: Lessons from the Canadian Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Crisis (Toronto: 
Rotman-UTP Publishing, 2016) at 23‒24. 
24        Anita Anand and Maziar Peihani
a market in which securities regulators permit issuers to distribute securities without a full-
blown prospectus or, in the case of the short-term debt exemption that was used to distribute 
ABCP, any disclosure at all. 
So, in the years preceding the crisis, the third-party ABCP market expanded aggressively on a 
fragile business model while the risks it posed to the broader financial system grew and were 
generally unmonitored by any of the regulators. Then, when the crisis finally hit, the federal and 
provincial governments ultimately provided a $14-billion liquidity facility to restore trust in the 
ABCP market and support restructuring of the papers.78 
Five originating factors can help explain the magnitude of this crisis. First, ABCP issuers were 
exempt from securities law prospectus requirements, which would have mandated a certain 
level of disclosure with respect to the notes or commercial paper being issued.79 As John Chant 
observes, the disclosure that accompanied ABCP failed to communicate the associated risks; 
for example, information relating to the quality, mix and weighting of the assets underlying 
the notes (including highly leveraged exposure to derivatives) or the contingency of liquidity 
provision agreements that would have been useful information for investors in these securities.80 
Second, sponsors of ABCP issuers, or their activities in respect of them, were in many cases not 
subject to regulatory supervision. Banks treated their sponsorship of ABCP conduits as an off-
balance-sheet activity, which allowed them to evade regulatory capital requirements and other 
prudential requirements. 
Third, these domestic and foreign banks, as well as non-bank financial institutions, also acted as 
a source of liquidity for the ABCP conduits, providing them with standby lines of credit. Many 
such liquidity providers were not subject to capital requirements and were otherwise minimally 
regulated (i.e., if the provider was not a financial institution). 
Fourth, the conduct of rating agencies (in this case the Dominion Bond Rating Service) was 
unregulated, yet these were the agencies that were endorsing the securities for distribution.81 The 
use of the short-term debt exemption effectively delegated responsibility for oversight of the 
ABCP market from securities regulators to rating agencies. 
Fifth, the risks borne by ABCP were passed on to the public by investment dealers and 
salespeople who are subject to “know your client” and “suitability” rules administered by the 
Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC), but not to any explicit 
fiduciary duty.82 These salespeople did not understand the products they were selling,83 and 
78 IMF, “Canada: Financial System Stability Assessment ‒ Update” (February 2008), IMF Country Report No 08/59 at 
22, online: <www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/31/Canada-Financial-System-Stability-Assessment-
Update-21710>.
79 Anita Anand, “Is Systemic Risk Relevant to Securities Regulation?” (2010) 60:4 UTLJ 941 at 954 (Anand, “Systemic 
Risk”). Our discussion of these factors builds on the work of Chant, supra note 75 at 9.
80 Chant, supra note 75 at 10‒12, 23. See also Scott Hendry, Stéphane Lavoie & Carolyn Wilkins, Securitized Products, 
Disclosure, and the Reduction of Systemic Risk (BoC, 2010), online: <www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/
fsr-0610-hendry.pdf>. 
81 OSC, Designated Rating Organizations, Related Policies and Consequential Amendments, OSC NI 25-101, online: <www.
osc.gov.on.ca/en/28587.htm>.
82 Chant, supra note 75 at 15.
83 IIROC, Regulatory Study, Review and Recommendations Concerning the Manufacture and Distribution by IIROC Member 
Firms of Third-Party Asset-Backed Commercial Paper in Canada (October 2008) at 74.
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dense disclosure meant that investors had little hope of understanding the securities they were 
purchasing, even if they tried.
Collectively, these factors suggested weaknesses in the fragmented regulatory regime. Regulatory 
authorities failed to act in a coordinated manner, which perhaps allowed the ABCP crisis to 
evolve more quickly and to reach greater proportions than if regulators had worked together to 
forestall it.84 In other words, the diffusion of regulatory oversight (i.e., different bodies overseeing 
different aspects of the same market) reduced the ability of these bodies to appreciate the size 
and scope of the crisis and to act effectively ex ante to contain its effects.85 
In the aftermath of the GFC, various regulatory initiatives sought to incorporate some of the 
lessons from the ABCP experience. Legislative changes recognized the capacity of systemic risk 
to negatively impact the broader economy. For instance, Ontario’s Securities Act now contains 
an objective “to contribute to the stability of the financial system and the reduction of systemic 
risk.”86 Although not yet in force, the draft CMSA adopted as a core objective the “effective 
detection, prevention and management of systemic risk to Canada’s financial system.”87 
Yet the CMSA embodies a sectoral approach to systemic risk: because of constitutional 
limitations, it is concerned only with capital markets rather than the entire financial system. 
Furthermore, the administration of the legislation has been assigned to the CMRA, which is 
not a stand-alone federal regulator but a cooperative body whose jurisdiction reaches only the 
participating provinces and territories. 
In its recent decision on Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the proposed cooperative capital markets regulatory system 
(CCMRS).88 Nevertheless, the new national regulator will likely face challenges in securing 
necessary cooperation in data collection and systemic risk oversight from provinces, in particular 
Alberta and Quebec, which have refused to join the cooperative scheme.89 A notable challenge 
will be the oversight of derivatives markets, which falls within the provinces’ mandate of “day-
to-day” regulation of securities markets. At the same time, derivatives trading constitutes a 
meaningful source of systemic risk.90 To what extent the new national regulator could effectively 
oversee the developments in the derivatives markets, therefore, remains an important question.
84 Chant, supra note 75 at 40.
85 Although Chant does not explicitly advocate consolidation of financial regulation in Canada, he notes that “[w]ith 
consolidation, the regulator would be able to take a broad view and consider the overall effects of the measure and respond 
appropriately. The case for consolidation would be strengthened if there is evidence that communication between different 
parts of a single agency proves more effective than communication among agencies” (ibid).
86 Securities Act (Ontario), RSO 1990, c S.5, s 1.1.
87 See the Preamble in CCMRS, Capital Markets Stability Act – Draft for Consultation ( January 2016), online: <http://ccmr-
ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/cmsa-consultation-draft-revised-en.pdf>. 
88 Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, 2018 SCC 48 at paras 81–85.
89 See Harvey Naglie, “Not Ready for Prime Time: Canada’s Proposed New Securities Regulator” (2017) CD Howe 
Institute Commentary No 489 at 18, online: <www.cdhowe.org/public-policy-research/not-ready-prime-time-canada 
percentE2 percent80 percent99s-proposed-new-securities-regulator>. Note that Alberta and Quebec have not joined 
the CMRA; see CCMRS, “The Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System” (2018), online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.
ca/>; Anita Anand, “Canada’s new securities regulatory structure is a disservice to investors”, The Globe and Mail (31 May 
2017), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/new-securities-regulatory-structure-a-
disservice-to-investors/article35167692/>. 
90 Reference re Securities Act, supra note 25 at para 125; see also Anita Anand, “Supreme Court Opens the Door to a New 
Model of Securities Regulation”, online: <www.cdhowe.org/intelligence-memos/anita-anand-supreme-court-opens-door-
new-model-securities-regulation>.
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Toward a More Integrated Approach to  
Systemic Risk 
The absence of a macroprudential regulator may undermine efforts to monitor and take action 
on systemic risk. Both the IMF and the FSB have recommended assigning a macroprudential 
mandate to a single body that could take a “comprehensive view of systemic risk across all 
financial institutions and markets in Canada.”91 This recommendation is consistent with post-
crisis reforms in other jurisdictions that have overhauled their institutional architecture to close 
regulatory gaps and facilitate financial sector-wide oversight of vulnerabilities. In the United 
States, for example, the Dodd-Frank Act has created the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC), which is responsible for identifying systemic threats and recommending appropriate 
regulatory response.92 The FSOC collects data on systemic risk through the Office of Financial 
Research, facilitates information sharing and cooperation among regulators, and can designate 
non-bank firms and financial market infrastructure as systemically important.93
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Act (2012) established a twin-peaks regime 
that moved the overall responsibility for financial stability to the Bank of England.94 The 
Prudential Regulatory Authority, a subsidiary of the bank, regulates all systemically important 
financial institutions in banking, insurance and capital markets.95 The bank’s Financial Policy 
Committee (FPC) “identifies, monitors and takes action to remove or reduce systemic risks” 
with a comprehensive view of the UK financial system.96 While the FPC does not have direct 
regulatory authority over financial institutions, it can issue directions and recommendations to 
the relevant authorities.97 Finally, the European Union has established the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB), which is tasked with macroprudential oversight of the financial system 
across the whole Union.98 The ESRB can identify significant risks to financial stability and issue 
warnings and recommendations for remedial action.99 
Canadian authorities, however, have indicated that they will not pursue the recommendation 
to establish a macroprudential regulator. Unless the CMRA is created under the CCMR, 
the responsibility for systemic risk will remain with the array of organizations discussed 
above, including OSFI, the BoC, and the provincial and territorial securities regulatory 
authorities.100 The reluctance to establish a new macroprudential regulator can be explained by 
path dependency and an ongoing, unrelenting resistance of the existing regulatory regime to 
91 See IMF, FSSA, supra note 7 at 25; FSB, Peer Review of Canada: Review Report (2012) at 36, online: <www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_120130.pdf>. 
92 12 USC § 5323.
93 US Department of the Treasury, “Financial Stability Oversight Council”, online: <www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/
about/Pages/default.aspx>.
94 Financial Services Act 2012 (UK), s 9.
95 Ibid, s 2(A)&(B).
96 Ibid, s 9(C).
97 Ibid, s 9(G)&(H).
98 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a 
European Systemic Risk Board [2010] OJ, L 331, art 3(1).
99 Ibid, art 16(1).
100 IMF, Canada: 2017 Article IV Consultation – Press Release and Staff Report (Washington, DC: 2017) at 2, 13, 74, online: 
<www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2017/07/13/canada-2017-article-iv-consultation-press-release-and-staff-
report-45074> [IMF, 2017 Article IV Consultation].
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transformative changes, given the costs and resources involved in such a transition.101 Generally, 
path dependency can refer to decisions that may have been efficient ex ante, but that do not 
turn out to be efficient ex post. According to Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis, an original 
decision and its consequences may have been an inferior option in hindsight; however, these 
qualities are unknowable at the time the decision is made.102 At a later stage, it becomes clear 
that an alternative decision or path would have been more efficient, but the original decision is 
carried out due to continued commitment of resources. As they state, “there is a dependence on 
past conditions that leads to outcomes that are regrettable and costly to change.”103 
Institutional structures can be self-reinforcing, remaining on a given course in response to 
significant fixed costs associated with change, “learning effects” that reward knowledge of a 
particular practice, and expectations or preferences that solidify around the status quo.104 The 
self-reinforcing tendency implies increasing returns to institutional structures, practices or 
norms, while switching costs associated with institutional reform can be expected to rise over 
time. Paul Pierson explains that increasing returns mean that small events at “critical junctures” 
can have significant long-term consequences.105 Timing and political “inertia” are central, but 
change will usually be incremental.106 
Anand, Trebilcock and Rosenstock have argued that while the GFC may have indicated that 
some type of reform to the complement of regulators governing Canada’s financial system is 
necessary, arguments from path dependency suggest that “grand transformative changes are 
unlikely — or at least uncertain — and not necessarily a function of the severity of the GFC or 
the country at issue.”107 However, we maintain the possibility of incremental reforms, including 
changes to the legal mandates of existing regulatory institutions.108 Similarly, while path 
dependency creates inertia against institutional change, Mariana Prado and Michael Trebilcock 
argue that path dependency can clarify what has happened in the past and also can be used to 
inform the feasibility of institutional reforms.109
Specific to the Canadian securities regulatory system, path dependency refers to the durability 
of the regime and the importance of history in fashioning a reform agenda. In particular, path 
dependency helps to explain the current structure of the regime that has resulted from the 
development of Canadian constitutional law and province-based institutions (for example, 
legislatures and securities commissions) that have charge over the development of securities 
legislation. Together, the jurisprudence and relevant institutions stand as historical constraints 
on the ability to achieve an efficient securities regulatory regime in this country.110 
101 Anand, Trebilcock & Rosenstock in Anand, Systemic Risk, supra note 5.
102 Stan J Liebowitz & Stephen E Margolis, “The Fable of the Keys” (1990) 33:1 J L & Econ at 18.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid at 351; see also Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics” (2000) 94:2 Am Pol 
Sci Rev 251 at 254.
105 See Mariana Prado & Michael J Trebilcock, “Path Dependence, Development and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform” 
(2009) 59 UTLJ 342 at 357.
106 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 44, 153.
107 Anand, Trebilcock & Rosenstock in Anand, Systemic Risk, supra note 5.
108 Ibid.
109 Prado & Trebilcock, supra note 105 at 353.
110 See generally Anita Anand & Peter Klein, “Inefficiency and Path Dependency in Canada’s Securities Regulatory System: 
Towards a Reform Agenda” (2005) 42:1 Can Bus LJ 41. 
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Nevertheless, whereas a complete institutional overhaul may never gather sufficient momentum 
in Canada, incremental reforms to achieve better regulatory outcomes are feasible. The absence 
of a formal macroprudential regulator does not prevent the existing authorities from working 
collectively to promote financial stability as a common good.111 Indeed, most international 
bodies that have been leading post-crisis regulatory reforms, such as the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision or the FSB, operate outside the formal law-making processes.112 These 
bodies are not the product of treaties and they lack any formal powers to impose rules on 
sovereign nations, but their standards have been enormously influential and have been largely 
followed by domestic jurisdictions.113 
In a similar vein, Canadian regulators can seek to achieve communication and coordination 
through informal bodies, and the existing institutional flexibility can indeed facilitate regulatory 
experimentation in the face of complexity and the rapid pace of change in financial markets.114 
However, effective oversight of systemic risk requires establishing a robust agenda with clear 
goals and processes. First and foremost, a comprehensive picture of interlinkages and system-
wide trends needs to be further developed. The BoC’s Financial System Review can be an 
important stepping stone in this respect as it provides many important insights on systemic 
vulnerabilities. The BoC’s analysis can be further complemented with input from the CMRA, 
which has both the authority and mandate to collect and analyze data on systemic risk in capital 
markets. 
Conclusion
The GFC triggered an unprecedented wave of regulatory reforms that continue to unfold 
more than a decade later. While some substantive reforms, such as the Basel III requirements, 
have been relatively similar across jurisdictions, institutional and structural reforms remain 
widely uneven. Some jurisdictions have established new institutions with specific mandates for 
financial stability, however Canada continues to have a patchwork of regulators in charge of 
different segments of the financial system. The costs and resources involved in transformative 
changes, reinforced by the unique constitutional characteristics of Canada, can help to explain 
the inertia against institutional overhaul. 
The fragmented nature of the existing regulatory model undermines systemic risk oversight and 
severely strains regulatory communication and coordination. Risky products and practices can 
build up outside the individual purview of regulators, such that their systemic implications go 
111 On financial stability as a common good, see Tucker, supra note 6 at 21–22. 
112 For further discussion on transnational regulatory networks and the rising prominence of soft law in global finance, 
see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 14; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter & David Zaring, “Networks Go International: An Update” (2006) 6:12 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 215 at 215; 
Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) at 63–64. 
113 See BIS, Basel Committee Charter (5 June 2018), art 3, online: <www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm>; FSB, Charter of the 
Financial Stability Board, art 23, online: <www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Charter-with-revised-Annex-FINAL.
pdf>; see also Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A Wessel & Jan Wouters, “The Exercise of Public Authority through Informal 
International Lawmaking: An Accountability Issue?” (2011) Jean Monnet Working Paper 06/11, New York University 
School of Law at 13.
114 See Eilís Ferran & Kern Alexander, “Can Soft Law Bodies be Effective? Soft Systemic Risk Oversight Bodies and the 
Special Case of the European Systemic Risk Board” (2010) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No 
36/2011, online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676140>. 
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unaddressed. When this happens, it will only take an unpredictable trigger, such as refusal to 
extend liquidity to non-bank conduits in the ABCP episode, to cause a crisis to erupt. Regulators 
may then find that they have little choice but to bail out the failing institutions. 
Since a complete institutional overhaul seems unfeasible, we argue for incremental reform 
and improvements to the existing institutions and cooperation channels for better oversight 
of systemic risk. In the absence of the CMRA taking shape, we recommend that high-level 
inter-agency groupings such as SAC take a leadership role on systemic risk management and 
mitigation. These institutions should establish a clear mission and agenda to promote financial 
stability, ensuring that system-wide vulnerabilities are detected and addressed in a timely and 
comprehensive fashion.
Further attention also needs to be paid to the connections between different policy domains 
and the vulnerabilities that can arise outside the traditional prudential domain. One important 
area is the interlinkage between monetary policy and financial stability. In the aftermath of the 
GFC and Canada’s 2014 oil shock, interest rates have remained at historically low levels.115 The 
prolonged low interest rates, which reflect the central bank’s struggle to bring inflation back to 
target, have aimed to stimulate economic activity and growth.116 
At the same time, however, loose monetary policy has led to the buildup of leverage in the 
financial system, which has translated in the Canadian context into increasing household debt 
and elevated housing prices.117 As a result, both households and financial institutions are highly 
exposed to the risks of rising interest rates, income shocks and deflating asset prices.118 It is 
therefore important not only to consider financial stability in the conduct of monetary policy 
but also to deploy macroprudential tools, such as a strong leverage ratio for financial institutions 
and loan-to-income ratios for households to limit leverage in the system.119 Such measures 
could help to enhance resilience against the deflation of housing prices and insolvencies ensuing 
from fire sales that often accompany a “leverage cycle crash.”120
Finally, monopolistic emphasis on D-SIBs’ regulation is insufficient, as it excludes systemically 
important institutions that are chartered at the provincial level. Although some provinces, such 
as British Columbia and Quebec, have designated their large credit unions to be systemically 
115 BIS, Committee on the Global Financial System, “Financial stability implications of a prolonged period of low interest 
rates” (2018) CGFS Papers No 61 at 1, online: <www.bis.org/publ/cgfs61.pdf>; for the historical trend of interest rates in 
Canada, see Trading Economics, “Canada Interest Rate” (2018), online: <https://tradingeconomics.com/canada/interest-
rate>.
116 Timothy Lane, “Monetary Policy and Financial Stability – Looking for the Right Tools” (Remarks delivered at HEC 
Montreal, Montreal, 8 February 2016), online: <www.bankofcanada.ca/2016/02/monetary-policy-financial-stability-
looking-right-tools/>. 
117 Ibid.
118 In its economic outlook, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) notes that housing 
prices in Canada are both overvalued and rising, noting that the economy is vulnerable to both income shocks and higher 
borrowing costs. See OECD, “Focus on house prices” (2017), online: <www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/focusonhouseprices.
htm>. 
119 As John Geanakoplos notes, “The best way to stop a crash is to act long before it occurs, by restricting leverage in 
ebullient times.” See John Geanakoplos, “The Leverage Cycle” (2010) Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No 1715R 
at 4, online: <https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d17/d1715-r.pdf>; see also Emilios Avgouleas, “Bank 
Leverage Ratios and Financial Stability: A Micro- and Macroprudential Perspective” (2015) Levy Economics Institute of 
Bard College Working Paper No 849 at 23–24, online: <www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_849.pdf>.
120 Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, “Reviewing the Leverage Cycle” (2013) Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No 1918 
at 28, online: <www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/research/events/2013/uncertaintygeanakoplos.pdf>. 
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important institutions,121 others, such as Alberta, have not yet established a framework for 
enhanced regulation and supervision of their systemically important institutions.122 This lack of 
multi-jurisdictional regulatory coordination creates regulatory gaps that threaten the stability 
of Canada’s financial system.
Further effort is required to identify obstacles that hinder sharing data and communication 
among regulators, and to address them, whether through existing channels for cooperation or 
through legislative changes, if necessary. For example, the BoC’s ability to build a comprehensive 
picture of the shadow banking system has been hindered by legal and logistical obstacles in 
sharing data among relevant authorities.123
At the heart of this chapter is a desire to enhance Canada’s risk mitigation capacity by reflecting 
upon the lessons of the GFC. Canada may have fared well in the events of the GFC relative to 
most other economies. However, complacency in the face of systemic risks may undermine the 
country’s prospective preparedness. 
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